

~~SECRET~~

1400008478

*CORONA*

CRITIQUE FOR MISSION 9029

I. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

- A. On 17 November 1961 mission was added to the master schedule with a launch date of 12 December 1961.
- B. [redacted] was briefed and approved the camera program on 21 November 1961.
- C. Mission was launched at 2041Z on 12 December 1961.

II. MISSION OPERATION

- A. Launch normal (show orbital characteristics).
- B. Show individual days passes.
- C. Recovery scheduled for 16/2244Z.
- D. Air snatch unsuccessful (read Col. Murphy's remarks).

III. PROBLEM AREAS AND RECOMMENDED ACTION

- A. On 17 November requests for mission planning data were sent to DB, INTEL, and WX Sections. Answer was received only from the WX Section. Action: Addressees should meet suspense dates as requested. [redacted] directed that procedures remain in effect and that branches concerned provide data as requested.
- B. Confusion within the Division as to type of film and where it should be placed on the spool existed after the camera program had been approved and transmitted. Action: All requests for engineering tests should be submitted in writing after the various Branches have coordinated and they have been approved by Chief, DB.

*Recommended action approved with the addition that AC/DPD will give final approval of test programs.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C. [redacted] late arrival resulted in a delay in getting the actual ephemeris plotted. Action: Read Col. Murphy's recommendation on this subject. [redacted] *action approved*

D. During the mission the COMOR Target Book was consulted and the data contained therein was found to be outdated. Action: The INTEL Section should either bring the book up to date, prepare their own notes on the targets, or have a representative attend each operational briefing. [redacted] *will discuss with Mr Reber and [redacted]*

E. Requests for mission progress reports from other than Agency personnel. Action: Restate [redacted] policy on this subject. *This subject will be reviewed by [redacted] and Mr Reber.*

F. Exactly where does the responsibility lie for insuring delivery of the take from the recovery area to [redacted]? Action: State [redacted] decision on this matter.

G. Who is responsible for maintaining liaison with [redacted] during the processing of the take? Action: Get [redacted] policy on this subject. [redacted] *will discuss with Mr [redacted]*

H. How much post-mission data should we release to Dr. Charyk's office? Action: Same as above. *Same as para E.*

I. Targeting is only on two overlays. For four day missions there should be four boards available. Action: Have additional overlays made.

J. During the second day a solar condition of three was reported. An investigation revealed our automatic warning service did not work. Action: Check into the procedures being used and improve them where necessary. [redacted] *will follow up and assure accomplishment.*

#### IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH CRITIQUE OF MSN 9025

A. Problem areas that have not been solved or are being repeated.

~~SECRET~~

1. Computer malfunction at [redacted] delayed plotting of first day's ephemeris.

2. [redacted] COMMO facility was not operational on a 24 hour basis as promised. *Mr Parangosky will handle.*

B. Areas of noted improvement

1. Targets have been numbered on the INTEL overlay.
2. Posting of the mission was done in very efficient manner.

V. COMMENTS FROM OTHER BRANCHES

- A. Weather Section
- B. Development Branch
- C. Intelligence Staff
- D. Control Center
- E. Chief, COMMO Staff
- F. Security Branch